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1Non-Catastrophic Endogenous Growth with Pollution and Abatement
Abstract:
When there are pollution externalities the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto-
optimal nor environmentally sustainable even if abatement activities are endogenously
decided. In this paper we introduce the possibility of an ecological catastrophe like the
one predicted by the global climate change, imposing the constraint of an upper-limit to
the pollutants stock. We characterize the socially optimal solution and study conditions
for the sustainability of the balanced growth path. We ﬁnd a trade-oﬀ between envi-
ronmental quality and growth. The rate of growth depends negatively on the weight of
environmental care in the utility function and positively on the population growth rate.
We show that the emissions reduction recommended in the Kioto protocol is an appro-
priate policy to avoid the ecological catastrophe and ensure global eﬃciency and positive
long-run growth.
Keywords: Environment, Externalities, Optimal Growth, Ecological Catastrophe, Sus-
tainability.
JEL classiﬁcation: C61, C62, O41, Q5.
21 Introduction
In a recent work on endogenous growth theory and the environment [Smulders (1999)],
we can read that “Many other models only incorporate a ﬂow variable to represent the
environment. Thus ignoring the accumulation of wastes and the irreversibility of envi-
r o n m e n t a ld a m a g e ,t h e s em o d e l sa r en o ta b l et oe x a m i n et h ep o s s i b l ec o n ﬂict between
short-run and long-run consequences of economic growth on the environment, but they
p r o v et ob eau s e f u ls i m p l i ﬁc a t i o nt oe x a m i n e ,f o ri n s t a n c e ,t h ee ﬀects of diﬀerent envi-
ronmental tax issues”. The lesson is that the stock of accumulated pollutants has to be
explicitly incorporated into models when we study the issue of long-run growth sustain-
ability. In such a case, if pollution increases with economic growth, it may happen that
growth ceases when the stock reaches a certain upper-bounding level. Moreover, long-run
sustainability depends not simply on the level of emissions but also on the assimilative
capacity of the environment. Indeed, as López (1994) points out, the world’s capacity
to absorb pollution is limited and once pollution stock approaches the absolute tolerable
l i m i t ,e c o n o m i cg r o w t hw o u l dn o tb e c o m ef e a s i b l ea n y m o r eb e c a u s et h ee c o n o m yw i l lb e
falling down into an extreme situation of catastrophic state.
T h ep r e v i o u sp o i n tl e a d su st h i n k i n gt h a ti ti so fg r e a tr e l e v a n c et oa s kw h e t h e rt h e r e
are limits to growth. The global economic collapse is more probable that arises in models of
endogenous growth, in which the economy follows a path with sustained long-run growth,
if pollution emissions appear positively related to the economic activity (production and
consumption) as a by-product [Gradus and Smulders (1993), Ligthart and Ploeg (1994),
Michel and Rotillon (1995), Mohtadi (1996)]. In such a case, if pollution tolerance is
limited it will be attained the state of ecological catastrophe that represents an eﬀective
and absolute limit to growth.
This problem, however, may be mitigated when it is possible for economic agents to
undertake emissions abatement activities or control for the degree of pollution associated
with production technologies [Gradus and Smulders (1993), Ligthart and Ploeg (1994),
Byrne (1997), Stokey (1998), Andreoni and Levinson (2001), Reis (2001)]. Actually,
3pollution stocks can be diminished not only by increasing the regenerative capacity or by
reducing the polluting activity, but also by means of pollution abatement actions that
contribute to determine the degree of dirtiness associated with technology as well as the
net ﬂow of pollutants to the environment. However, improving environmental quality
requires abatement expenditures that leave less resources available for growth-oriented
investment activities. Hence, a trade-oﬀ between production growth and environmental
quality has to be featured in this enlarged framework.
In general, under the existence of environmental externalities, it is expected to ﬁnd
lower rates of growth for output and pollution when pollution is optimally controlled.1
In this sense, the opportunity for pollution abatement generates a mechanism that may
act as a limit to growth, although less strong than the previous one. According to this,
the important question is whether economic growth and environmental protection are
reconcilable. That is, whether optimal sustained growth is compatible with ecological
sustainability of the economy as a whole. Moreover, the query on whether environmental
concern will eventually limit growth has to be answered looking at two diﬀerent issues:
ﬁrst, the eﬀects of pollution abatement on the long-run rate of growth; and second, the
evolution of the stock of pollutants with respect to the ecological catastrophic upper-limit.
All these questions will be analyzed more accurately in this paper in a simple model of
endogenous growth. Given that we are not directly interested on how technological change
has been originated, but on conditions under which sustained endogenous growth and
ecological sustainability are compatible, our model builds upon the traditional Rebelo’s
(1991) one-sector AK model to which we incorporate pollution. Moreover, this model is
also appropriate because of its simplicity, which allows us to focus on the performance of
developed economies and their outcomes in the long run, the period in which sustainability
appears as a relevant issue.
1Things could be diﬀerent if a pollution externality on the side of production is considered [Gradus and
Smulders (1993), Ewijk and Wijnbergen (1995), Mohtadi (1996), Smulders and Gradus (1996)]. In such
a case, environmental quality changes production opportunities by aﬀecting the economy’s productivity,
and an increase in environmental care may boost growth.
4Welfare depends on consumption but also on the quality of the environment where
agents consume. In this model pollution arises from production and enters the consumer’s
utility function playing the role of a local externality. This externality is explained by
the existence of numerous agents who take into account the local eﬀect which pollution
ﬂow exerts on their respective utilities, without having any inﬂuence on the generating
process which mainly depends on ﬁrms. One central aspect of the analysis below is
the explicit consideration of abatement activities. These are costly because they absorb
resources reducing investment and consumption possibilities. In this setting households
show environmental concern but they do not decide on abatement while ﬁrms, which take
into account the cost of such an activity, do not receive the corresponding beneﬁts.2
Moreover, there is another externality which arises from the fact that people take into
account the local negative eﬀect from the ﬂow of pollution, but they are not aware of the
global negative eﬀect from an eventual ecological catastrophe. This is an aggregate welfare
externality because individual agents decide on the emissions ﬂow but do not control for
the accumulated stock of pollutants. However, the aggregate stock will have a drastic
eﬀect on the individual agent’s welfare at the moment of economic collapse. This matter
shows a strong parallelism with the real problem of the enhanced greenhouse eﬀect caused
by anthropogenic pollution emissions. Economic activity releases greenhouse gases into
the atmosphere. To a certain extent they are removed by sinks but one important part of
them are stored in the atmospheric reservoir. This increases the greenhouse eﬀect which
results in an additional global warming of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere. Once the
accumulated stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere goes beyond a critical level, it
may adversely aﬀect ecosystems causing a drastic climate change. Face to this problem,
economic agents are concerned about the local eﬀects of pollution but they do not consider
the global eﬀect for decision making. In this context, the Kyoto protocol makes evident
the previous aggregate externality problem and implements policies and measures which
2We ignore here any other local externality associated with the ﬂow of pollution, which could play a
signiﬁcant role by aﬀecting the productivity of factors via the health of workers or the quality of inputs.
5try to control and reduce emissions ﬂows.3
Because of these two environmental externalities the competitive equilibrium does not
work well. On the one hand, the equilibrium path is not Pareto-optimal and, on the other
hand, this path leads the economy to the state of ecological catastrophe. Consequently,
we will study the opportunities for an eﬃcient management of the economy with special
attention to the potential risk of an environmental and economic collapse. Eﬃciency, as
traditionally assumed, is not suﬃcient for sustainability but, as we will show, Pareto op-
timality is necessary to produce sustainable outcomes. Moreover, along the article we are
going to answer the usual questions: (i) Do environmental externalities inﬂuence growth?
(ii) What are conditions for sustained balanced growth when environment matters? (iii)
Which is the eﬀect of environmental concern on the rate of growth? (iv) Will pollution
controls and abatement reduce growth rates? (v) Under what conditions is sustainability
feasible?
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy and introduces
the assumptions featuring a general equilibrium one-sector endogenous growth model in
which pollution is a by-product of economic activity, but it may be reduced by spend-
ing a fraction of the aggregate output on abatement. In section 3 we brieﬂy study the
decentralized competitive equilibrium without regulation. In sections 4 and 5 we study
the socially optimal solution assuming suﬃcient conditions for interior solutions. Using
the unconstrained trajectories, we characterize growth in the social optimum and analyze
under what conditions sustained balanced growth is feasible. Section 6 focuses on ecologi-
cal sustainability and non-catastrophic growth, with special attention to conditions which
ensure them. There, we solve the general model allowing for corner solutions and study
how, if pollution stock reaches the upper-limit, the central planner could change the value
of the dirtiness index. We also characterize growth in the aftermath and compare with
the previous one. Finally, section 7 summarizes and concludes.
3The Kioto protocol establishes the necessary cooperating context where the adverse consequences of
this second externality may be solved and sustainability guaranteed.
62T h e e c o n o m y
2.1 Production
The model economy is a one sector closed economy. Output is obtained according to an
aggregate production function of the AK type where capital is the only factor needed to
produce,
Y (t)=AK(t).( 1 )
In this model K is an aggregate composite of diﬀerent sorts of capital which, in a
broad sense, includes physical as well as human capital. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that this production function arises from the direct summation of the individual
production functions for many identical ﬁrms.
2.2 Pollution and abatement
One feature of this model, absent from the canonical endogenous growth AK model, is
the existence of a stock of pollutants S that is increased by polluting activities such as
production Y , and is reduced by abatement B as well as by the corresponding natural
regeneration at a constant rate δ > 0.4 Moreover, it is assumed an upper-limit for S, called
Smax, which plays the role of a critical value for which if the current stock goes beyond
it, a catastrophic state is reached in the economy. Under these assumptions, sustainable
development will be characterized as a situation where the main economic variables show
positive long-run balanced growth while, at the same time, they contribute to generate
an accumulated stock of pollutants smaller than (or equal to) the critical value Smax.
The above-mentioned abatement eﬀort B, which is costly and endogenously decided
by agents, will be measured in terms of output Y (t) in such a way that these two variables
4An alternative to this constant exponential rate of pollution decay, which implies that natural regen-
eration is a linear function of the pollution stock, is the inverted U-shaped decay function modelized by
Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) and Tahvonen and Salo (1996). This one implies that a pollution stock
level that is suﬃciently high will reduce the rate of natural regeneration to zero.
7relate to each other according to
B(t)=Y (t) − YN(t)=( 1− z(t))Y (t).( 2 )
Here z(t) represents, as in Stokey (1998) and the opposite to Reis (2001), a measure of
the eﬀective dirtiness of the technique used to produce. Obviously, z(t)=1−
B(t)
Y (t) ∈ [0,1]
because resources devoted to clean pollution could never pass the upper bound established
by current production. Therefore, any choice for z close to zero or one automatically
makes the existing technique less or more polluting respectively. The above expression
introduces a deﬁnition for the net output as
YN(t)=z(t)Y (t).( 3 )
The equation governing the motion of S may be written as
•
S (t)=P (Y (t),B(t)) −
δS (t),w h e r eP (Y (t),B(t)) represents the emissions ﬂow associated with the endoge-
nously determined levels of polluting and abatement activities. This ﬂow is increasing
with respect to Y and decreasing with respect to B,i . e .P1 > 0 and P2 < 0. Function
P (.) is assumed homogeneous of degree zero, i.e. an equal proportional increase in both
output and abatement leaves the emissions ﬂow unchanged. Consequently, the emissions





, where we assume strict concavity:
E0 < 0, lim
x→0+ E0 < 0, −∞ < lim
x→1− E0 < 0, E00 < 0, E (0) = EM > 0 and E (1) = 0.
Actually, EM represents an eﬀective upper bound for the emissions function, which is
high enough to conduct the economy, if it prevails, to the state of ecological catastrophe.5
Now, substituting the previous variable transformations into the diﬀerential equation for
the motion of the stock of pollutants we get
•
S (t)=E (1 − z(t)) − δS (t),( 4 )
where Ez = −E0 > 0, 0 < lim
z→0+ Ez < +∞, lim
z→1− Ez > 0 and Ezz = E00 < 0.T a k i n g
as reference z =1 , which implies that no abatement eﬀort is done and that emissions
5Tahvonen and Salo (1996) conceives this upper bound as the emissions level for which residents decide
to move to other locations. On the other hand, we can interpret these emissions as a maximum level
beyond which production starts to be delocalized by transferring abroad the polluting technology.
8ﬂow reaches the maximum level EM, the larger the reduction in z t h em o r ee ﬀective the
reduction in emissions. Or, put in other words, as long as we produce with a cleaner
technology, the eﬀectiveness measured in terms of emissions reduction of any additional
pollution abatement that reduces z, will be larger.6
2.3 Investment
According to the aggregate resources constraint, net output may be devoted to consump-
tion or capital accumulation. For the sake of simplicity we do not consider capital depre-
ciation. Hence, net investment equals gross investment and the capital stock is governed
by the diﬀerential equation
C(t)+
•
K (t)=Y (t) − B(t).( 5 )
This equation also reﬂects the cost of the abatement activity in a very simple way:
one additional unit of abatement eﬀort is automatically ‘transformed’ into a lower unit
of output available for consumption or capital accumulation. This particular ‘one-to-one’
transformation contributes to simplify our analysis.
2.4 Preferences
The economy is populated by many identical and inﬁnitely lived agents. Population,
denoted by N, is assumed to be growing at a constant rate 0 <n<A . The initial pop-
ulation N(t0) is normalized to one. Individual preferences are assumed to be represented
by a twice continuously diﬀerentiable instantaneous utility function V (c(t),P(t)),w h i c h
depends positively on the current per capita consumption c and negatively on the emis-
sions ﬂow P [Gradus and Smulders (1993), Ligthart and Ploeg (1994), Selden and Song
(1995), Reis (2001)]. Under this assumption, households do not take care for the stock of
6There is not empirical evidence about this assumption and, moreover, even if we assume convexity,
given the nature of the model, the results below do not change. Instead, the concavity assumption allows
for a huge simpliﬁcation of all subsequent analysis concerning suﬃcient conditions for optimality and the
convergence of integrals.
9pollutants in the environment, but only for the current ﬂow of polluting emissions. This
is because the local stock eﬀect of pollution is assumed short-lived and the abatement
activity, which reduces emissions and facilitates regeneration, makes the local stock eﬀect
negligible.7
As we have previously shown, emissions depend positively on production and nega-
tively on pollution abatement, two variables that appear related to each other according
to (2). Moreover, the deﬁnition of the emissions function establishes a monotonic decreas-
ing relationship between the emissions ﬂow and the ratio abatement to output. Hence,
we may consider the abatement eﬀort relative to the economy’s dimension as the second
argument in the utility function, which means that households derive utility directly from
the aggregate eﬀort addressed to reduce pollution emissions. That is, utility indirectly
depends on environment quality, which is increased by abatement and reduced by pro-
duction. In this model, moreover, we ﬁnd that the dimension of the economy may be
measured by output as well as by capital stock, given the linear form of the production






with Uc > 0 and U2 > 0. Or, given that the relationship between abatement and pro-
duction allows for the substitution B
Y =1− z,a l s oa sU (c(t),z(t)) with Uz = −U2 < 0.8
Moreover, we assume decreasing marginal utilities: Ucc < 0 and Uzz = U22 < 0,a sw e l la s
strict concavity with respect to both arguments taken together, UccU22 − (Uc2)
2 > 0.
The structure of the model allows for the existence of a long-run balanced growth path,
7This also implies that we ignore global stock eﬀects in the representation of households’ preferences.
An important stream of literature considers that welfare depends on the stock of pollution rather than
on the current ﬂow [Huang and Cai (1994), Mohtadi (1996), Tahvonen and Salo (1996), Byrne (1997),
Kelly (2003)]. However, if the ﬂow of pollution is increasing with production, then capital accumulation
that increases future output also increases future ﬂows of pollution. Hence, we ﬁnd a general consensus
in the literature [Gradus and Smulders (1993), Smulders and Gradus (1996), Aghion and Howitt (1998),
Reis (2001)] according to which, in the context of this model, if we consider the stock of pollution as an
argument in the utility function, we will obtain the same fundamental results but at the cost of a more
complex analysis.
8In short, given that P is an increasing monotonous transformation of z, the two ordinal utility
functions represent the same preference ordering.
10deﬁned as an allocation in which consumption per capita grows at a constant rate and
the dirtiness index is constant. To ensure that such a path may exist in this model it is
necessary to assume that the particular instantaneous utility function is multiplicatively
separable and of the CIES form [King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), Bovenberg and Smulders





α(1−Φ) .( 6 )
In this function, the parameter that represents the relative weight of environmental
care in utility is assumed to be positive and lower than one, 0 < α < 1, and the inverse
of the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution is allowed to be lower or greater
than one, 0 < Φ ≶ 1. The previous utility function fulﬁll all the above mentioned
assumptions concerning ﬁrst and second derivatives. The strict concavity assumption
requires as suﬃcient condition that the determinant of the Hessian matrix be positive,
which implies the additional parameter constraint Φ > α
1+α.10
3 The competitive solution
First of all, we will consider the structure of this economy from the point of view of
the non-regulated competitive equilibrium. In this economy, assuming that there are no
9Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) also considers additional restrictions on ecological relationships and
technology. With respect to the ﬁrst, we remind that hereafter we are going to study conditions for
ecologically non-catastrophic states. With respect to the second, we have to recall that our one sector
and one accumulable factor model builds upon a linear production function which summarizes the whole
set of technological requirements postulated by these authors.
10Environmental literature has long dealt with the sign of the second order cross derivative of the
instantaneous utility function [Michel and Rotillon (1995), Mohtadi (1996)]. In our case Uc2 = −Ucz =
α(1−Φ)c−Φ (1 − z)
α(1−Φ)−1, which is negative (positive) as long as Φ is greater (smaller) than one. That
is, as long as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is smaller (greater) than one. Empirical evidence
seems to corroborate the case of a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution and, hence, Uc2 < 0.
This implies that the marginal utility of consumption decreases as the environmental quality increases.
Namely, consumption and pollution are complements in terms of preferences. However, the model works
exactly the same in the opposite case in which Uc2 > 0.
11depreciation charges, each competitive ﬁrm faces the following stationary optimization
problem, given the absence of adjustment costs and any other intertemporal element in
its present value maximization problem,
max
{Ki,zi}
Πi = Yi − rKi − Bi
s.t. 0 6 zi 6 1,
Yi = AKi,
Bi =( 1− zi)Yi,
Ki > 0.
The ﬁrst order conditions are
r = Azi,( 7 )
0=( 1− zi)AKi.( 8 )
From (8), because of the slackness condition, we observe that it is optimal from the
point of view of the individual ﬁrm to ﬁx zi =1and then, by (7), we get r = A.T h e s e
results imply zero quasi-rents at the maximum. But this also means that individual ﬁrms
have no incentive to allocate resources to pollution abatement because of the externality
originated in the conﬂict between the private nature of the cost of this activity and the
social nature of its beneﬁts, which are beyond the ﬁrm’s control. Consequently, in the
competitive equilibrium we will observe that production is undertaken by ﬁrms with the
most polluting of the available production techniques.
Instead, households preferences are sensitive to the pollution emissions ﬂow as has
been represented in their utility functions. They show a clear preference for reducing
z below unity according to the assumption Uz < 0 ∀z. We don’t need to explicitly
solve the optimization problem for households. Actually, given the form of the utility
function households will never choose such an extreme value for z, and this will generate
a fundamental market mismatch between abatement demand and supply that exactly
reﬂects the consequences of the above-mentioned externality. There is no incentive for
12agents to internalize the negative external eﬀect and, consequently, the equilibrium path
is not Pareto optimal.
On the other hand, although it has not been included as an argument in the utility
function, we also have to consider in our analysis the evolution of the aggregate stock of
pollutants S because it is crucial from the point of view of the sustainability of the long-
run economy’s aggregate outcomes. However, this is not controlled by ﬁrms or households
individually because both take as given the level of this stock. In fact, the competitive
equilibrium that leads the ﬁrm to choose the dirtiest technique to produce, z =1 ,h a s
dreadful implications with respect to the sustainability problem. Consider the equation
governing the motion of the aggregate stock of pollutants under such an extreme value
•






δ .T h e nS
monotonically increases converging to the value EM
δ >S max, which means that eventually
the state of ecological catastrophe will be reached.
In conclusion, the presence of a welfare pollution externality in a decentralized com-
petitive economy, which imply not much abatement and too much pollution, calls for some
sort of public intervention. Without any corrective environmental policy the environment
will be damaged up to the level of irreversible catastrophe, and sustained growth, if there
exists, will not be sustainable.
4 Optimality conditions
Now, we will focus on the socially optimal solution for the model economy described in
previous sections.11 As we have shown, there are two externalities connected with the
environmental problem: one local and the other aggregate. The ﬁrst one conforms to
the traditional view according to which an externality is present whenever the welfare of
11The matter of how to replicate the eﬃcient path in a competitive economy by means of an optimal
environmental policy, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the reader will ﬁnd in Mohtadi (1996),
Smulders and Gradus (1996), as well as in Rubio and Aznar (2002) a discussion of how the government
can implement pollution charges, emission standards and public abatement, which allow the competitive
economy to generate eﬃcient outcomes in an endogenous growth model with an AK technology.
13some agents (households) depends on variables whose values are chosen by others (ﬁrms).
Instead, the second one works like an extreme welfare (technological) externality because
individual decisions on pollution emissions do have uncontrolled eﬀects on the aggregate
stock of pollutants, which in turn will have a drastic eﬀect on the agent’s welfare from the
moment of the ecological catastrophe (economic collapse). The socially optimal solution
simultaneously internalizes both externalities. First, by considering the total costs and
beneﬁts from pollution abatement and, second, by taking into account the global negative
eﬀect from an eventual ecological catastrophe associated with the accumulated stock of




















if S (τ) >S max ∀τ >t c,w h e r etc < ∞ represents the period in which occurs the
ecological catastrophe and the corresponding economic collapse.
Assuming that the central planner is intended for maximizing social welfare, the way
he can reach this target implies to maximize W subject to the constraint S (t) 6 Smax.
However, in this section we shall study interior solutions alone. Therefore, although the
dynamic optimization problem has to be formulated introducing as an explicit constraint
the no-catastrophe condition, which implies that the central planner takes care of trajec-
tories leading to catastrophic states and optimally decides to avoid them by choosing the
controls appropriately, we leave such a general procedure for a next section. For now, we
specify the optimization problem without this state constraint that applies throughout the
planing period, but take into account the evolution of the aggregate stock of pollutants
in the environment.12 Accordingly, we will obtain unconstrained optimal trajectories for
12We do that in line with the recommendation of Chiang (1992): “Although we cannot in general expect
the unconstrained solution to work, it is not a bad idea to try anyway. Should that solution turn out to
satisfy the constraint, then the problem would be solved. Even if not, useful clues will usually emerge
14which we are going to check below whether they are ecologically sustainable or not. In
particular, we will show suﬃcient conditions on parameters that ensure the sustainability
of such trajectories. Moreover, a similar decision is made here with respect to the static
control constraints 0 6 z 6 1. At this stage we ignore these constraints but, later on,
we will also check them for the solution trajectories. This will lead us to identify two
parameter conditions which make the control variable bounded.
Under these premises, assuming interiority with respect to the static constraints, the
planner’s problem consists in choosing the sequence {c(t), z (t), t ≥ t0} which, for a given











for k(t0)=k0 > 0 and s(t0)=s0 > 0 given.
From now on we will use lowercase letters to represent variables in per capita terms.





c1−Φ (1 − z)
α(1−Φ)
1 − Φ
+ q[Akz − c − nk]+µ[e(1 − z) − (δ + n)s],
where q and µ are the co-states for k and s, respectively, and represent their corresponding
shadow prices. The ﬁrst order necessary conditions are
q = c
−Φ (1 − z)





αc1−Φ (1 − z)
α(1−Φ)
Ak(1 − z)
.( 1 0 )
As we have seen, gross product may be allocated to consumption, investment or
abatement. On the margin, according to (9), goods must be equally valuable if they
are consumed or accumulated as new physical capital. Namely, the marginal utility of
consumption today must be equal to the marginal shadow value of physical capital (con-
sumption tomorrow). According to (10), at equilibrium the implicit price of a more dirty
regarding the nature of the true solution.” For a complete formulation of the optimal control problem,
including every relevant constraint, the reader may look at section 6.1 and the Appendix.
15technique, that is, the value measured in units of utility of the net marginal product from
am o r ed i r t yt e c h n i q u e( qAk) plus the shadow value of the marginal emission associated
with such a more dirty technique (µez), must be equal to the marginal utility of a cleaner
one. Namely, the entire valuation of a marginal reduction in resources devoted to abate-
ment, which contributes to increase consumption (present or future) as well as the stock
of pollutants, must be equal to the marginal utility of those resources when devoted to
abatement, which contribute to increase environmental quality. Moreover, the dynamic
conditions for quantities and shadow prices are
•
k= Akz − c − nk,( 1 1 )
•
q= ρq − Azq,( 1 2 )
•
s= e(1 − z) − (δ + n)s,( 1 3 )
•
µ=( ρ + δ)µ,( 1 4 )
together with initial conditions k0 and s0 and the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞ e
−(ρ−n)(t−t0)qk =0 ,( 1 5 )
lim
t→∞ e
−(ρ−n)(t−t0)µs =0 .( 1 6 )
Before the resolution of the whole dynamic system, we can study the block of equations
related to the stock of pollutants and its shadow price. Looking for that, we ﬁrst resolve
equation (14): µ(t)=µ(t0)e(ρ+δ)(t−t0). Then, we integrate (13): s(t)=s0e−(δ+n)(t−t0) +
R t
t0 e(1−z (τ))e−(δ+n)(t−τ)dτ. Finally, if we substitute both into the transversality condition





t0 e(1 − z (τ))e(δ+n)(τ−t0)dτ
o
=0 .T h i s c o n d i t i o n
holds if, and only if, µ(t0)=0because the integral on the r.h.s. cannot be negative.
Consequently, the above-mentioned solution to (14) determines that, ∀t ≥ t0,
µ(t)=0 .( 1 7 )
This implies that even when the central planner internalizes the costs and beneﬁts of
abatement activity, and takes into account the gradual evolution of the aggregate stock of
16pollutants in the environment, he optimally assigns zero value to the social shadow price
of the stock of pollutants. This is so because, although the central planner ensures an
eﬃcient resource management in the economy, his main goal consists in maximizing social
welfare and, since we are studying interior solutions, the state constraint involving the
stock of pollutants has been left out. That is, the potential impact of a drastic ecological
catastrophe has not been taken into account.
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Φ−α(1−Φ).( 2 0 )
Substituting (19) and (20) into (11) and (12), we get the dynamic system
•














Φ−α(1−Φ),( 2 1 )
•












Φ−α(1−Φ),( 2 2 )
with the initial condition k(t0)=k0 and the transversality condition (15). These two dif-
ferential equations conform a non-linear dynamic system, which has a particular structure
that makes it susceptible of being solved in closed form. Applying the method developed
in Ruiz-Tamarit and Ventura-Marco (2004), particularly Propositions 1 and 2,w ec o n -




A − ρ − α(ρ − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
(t − t0)
¾




A − ρ − α(ρ − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
(t − t0)
¾







Φ − α(1 − Φ)





.( 2 5 )
17Given the initial capital stock, k0, equation (25), which arises directly from the
transversality condition, gives the initial value for the shadow price, q(t0).O n c e t h e
two initial values are known, equations (23) and (24) determine unequivocally the com-
plete trajectories for these two variables. For any q(t0) other than the one given by (25)
the economy places on an explosive trajectory which does not satisfy optimality condi-
tions, in particular the transversality condition. Moreover, given bx ≡ α
α(1−Φ)
Φ−α(1−Φ) > 0,
the transversality condition holds if, and only if, ax ≡
ρ−A+Φ(A−n)
Φ−α(1−Φ) > 0. This parameter
constraint must be satisﬁed for any positive intertemporal elasticity of substitution, i.e.
0 < Φ ≷ 1, what is not obvious. However, the strict concavity assumption on the utility
function imposes the additional parameter constraint
Φ > α(1 − Φ).( 2 6 )
Hence, the transversality condition (15) holds if, and only if,
ρ >A (1 − Φ)+Φn.( 2 7 )
5 Sustained optimal balanced growth
Given (23) and the production function in per capita terms that arises from (1), we obtain
y(t)=Ak0 exp
½
A − ρ − α(ρ − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
(t − t0)
¾
,( 2 8 )
γy(t)=γk(t)=γ
∗ =
A − ρ − α(ρ − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
.( 2 9 )
The growth rates of per capita capital stock and output are equal to each other and
constant over time along their respective optimal solution trajectories. Using the control
functions for consumption and the degree of dirtiness associated with the technique, as
given in (19) and (20), we get the optimal solution trajectories for these two variables
c(t)=
ρ − A + Φ(A − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
k0 exp
½
A − ρ − α(ρ − n)
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
(t − t0)
¾








ρ − A + Φ(A − n)









AΦ − αρ + αΦn
A(Φ − α(1 − Φ))




The dirtiness index is expected to be bounded, i.e. 0 6 z∗ 6 1. However, for this to
be ensured we need additional parameter constraints. In particular,
Φ(A − n)+n(Φ − α(1 − Φ)) > α(ρ − n),( 3 2 )
Φ(A − n) > A − ρ,( 3 3 )
where it may be easily checked that (33) encompasses (27).
These results completely characterize the socially optimal solution. k, c and y grow
at the same constant rate; the ratio consumption to capital stock is constant and posi-
tive; and the dirtiness index remains ﬁxed forever at a constant value between zero and
one. Therefore, the model does not predict transitional dynamics and all the endogenous
variables conform a balanced growth path from the beginning.13
If we examine a little more the previous results, we ﬁnd that there could be either
positive or negative growth, as well as stationarity. Given (29) and the strict concavity
assumption on the utility function, a positive rate of growth γ∗ > 0 arises when A − ρ >
α(ρ − n). This condition is compatible with the parameter constraints corresponding to
the transversality condition and the lower and upper bounds for z∗, giving
Φ(A − n)+n(Φ − α(1 − Φ)) > Φ(A − n) > A − ρ > α(ρ − n) > 0.( 3 4 )






AΦ − αρ + αΦn
Φ − α(1 − Φ)
,
the real return to capital is endogenously determined by preferences and technology parameters. The
previous expression also shows that only in the absence of environmental concern, α =0 , the interest rate
is equal to A, as in the canonical model. Otherwise, it is lower because of the transversality condition
(27).
19On the other hand, stationarity γ∗ =0arises when A−ρ = α(ρ−n),w h i c hc o m b i n e d
with the remaining parameter constraints leads to
Φ(A − n)+n(Φ − α(1 − Φ)) > Φ(A − n) > A − ρ = α(ρ − n) > 0.( 3 5 )
In this case all the variables conform a steady state, which is ‘chosen’ among a multi-
plicity by the predetermined initial value of per capita capital stock. Finally, although less
economically relevant, we could also ﬁnd negative growth, γ∗ < 0,w h e nA−ρ < α(ρ−n).
This is the only case which allows for A 6 ρ.14
The absence of transitional dynamics that makes the short-run dynamics identical to
the long-run ones, leads us to undertake the comparative statics analysis for the socially































.( 3 7 )
The signs associated with A, ρ and Φ are the usual in the canonical AK model: the
larger the capital productivity and the higher the patience of agents, the greater the rate
of growth. A newer but very intuitive result is found here: the higher the weight of
environmental care in utility the smaller the rate of growth. That is, for higher values
of α that imply a higher marginal utility of abatement and a lower rate of return on
capital, the central planner optimally decides to devote more resources to abatement and
less to capital accumulation and, hence, to growth. However, an striking result arises
in this model because of the apparent positive relationship between the rate of growth
and the population growth rate. This result is absolutely dependent on the presence
of environmental concern in the model, because only in such a case a higher population
growth rate leads the central planner to divert resources from abatement and consumption
towards capital accumulation. This investment ﬂow is strong enough to compensate for
14More technical details about these cases, as well as a complete geometric characterization, may be
found in Ruiz-Tamarit and Ventura-Marco (2004).
20the new capital requirements due to a greater population, and also to generate a greater
rate of growth. Moreover, this eﬀect is stronger as higher is the weight of environmental
care in the utility function.15
The dirtiness index, in turn, depends positively on the productivity parameter when
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one, but the sign of this relation-
ship cannot be analytically decided for values of the elasticity lower than one. Moreover, if
we ﬁnd positive growth along the balanced path, the higher the level of patience of agents
the higher the value of z. This happens because when consumers are highly patient the
central planner optimally decides to reallocate resources towards capital accumulation,
which enhance growth, so intensively that even diverts some of the resources previously
devoted to pollution abatement, which leads to produce with a more dirty technique. Be-
c a u s eo ft h i sc r o w d i n go u te ﬀect, the higher the weight of environmental care in the utility
function the smaller the dirtiness index. Finally, the greater the population growth rate
the higher the dirtiness associated with the eﬀective production technique, which occurs
because for higher population growth rates the central planner decides to divert more
resources from abatement eﬀort.16
These two variables are closely related to each other. Actually, we can make this
relationship evident from the ﬁrst order conditions (11) and (18). If we take the ﬁrst one
and divide by k, and then substitute for the ratio c
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. The positive relationship between γ∗ and z∗ suggests that tighter
pollution controls and increased abatement, which reduce the dirtiness index, will have
negative eﬀects on the optimal rate of growth. This fact reﬂects the previous crowding
15A similar result, although there it is based on a diﬀerent explanation, may be found in Bartolini and
Bonatti (2003).
16The results concerning the population growth rate are consistent with propositions dicussed and tested
in Cropper and Griﬃths (1994). In that paper, the environment is not a factor that limits productivity
as population expands, but a good which quality is degraded by a growing population.
21out result according to which greener preferences associated with a shift in preferences
towards more environmental concern, i.e. a rise in α,a ﬀects negatively both the dirtiness
index and the rate of growth.
6 Environmental catastrophe and optimal growth sus-
tainability
One major problem considered in previous models of endogenous growth is the sustain-
ability of the long-run socially optimal and competitive balanced growth paths. This
problem has been largely studied in environmental literature where several deﬁnitions of
sustainability have been proposed [Pezzey (1997), Chichilnisky (1997)]. The most usual
concepts of sustainability rely on the intertemporal evolution of utility and consumption,
and impose a non-declining trajectory for any of these two variables. In general, sus-
tainability has been conceived as a situation where the needs of the present are satisﬁed
without compromising the needs of the future. This suggests a related problem associated
with the valuation of the well-being of present and future generations, and points to the
equity condition according to which we must avoid the underestimation of future utilities.
In our model, the previous requirements for sustainability are always met because the
socially optimal choices guarantee a monotonically increasing proﬁle for consumption and
utility. However, although conditions for a positive long-run rate of growth are satisﬁed,
there is a trade-oﬀ between growth and environmental quality. Environmental quality
is measured by the absence of pollution and increases with abatement but diminishes
with production. This trade-oﬀ, which results from agent decisions, involve the level of
abatement expenditures and, consequently, the value of the dirtiness index.
Sustainability may also be inspected into the model looking at the positive relation-
ship between the dirtiness index and the rateo fg r o w t ht h a tw a ss h o w ni n( 3 8 ) ,w h i c h
represents in other words the above-mentioned trade-oﬀ. As such relationship shows, the
more clean the used technology is, the lower the rate of growth. In particular, our model
22built upon the assumption that people show environmental awareness (α > 0)p r e d i c t sa
lower, or at most an equal, rate of growth relative to the rate of growth arising from the
canonical model where no environmental concern does exist (α =0 ). Moreover, as has
been shown in the previous section, γ∗ may be zero provided that α =
A−ρ
ρ−n > 0,w h i c h
is in accordance with the premise that more environmental concern comes in detriment
of growth. But this is an extreme case and, for any other value of α smaller than the
previous one, we are still allowed to conclude that positive sustained growth and environ-
ment preservation may be compatible in the long-run. That is, 0 6 γ∗ 6
A−ρ
Φ as long as
ρ
A 6 z∗ 6 1.
Nevertheless, the main question we are going to consider now is whether the socially
optimal results from the previous section are compatible with the general condition of no
environmental catastrophe, which imposes the constraint that S(t) must be lower than
(or equal to) Smax. In particular, we have to control at any moment in time the level of
S(t) associated with the positive balanced growth path. This approach becomes necessary
because along the previous formulation of the central planner’s optimization problem we
did not take explicitly into account the inequality constraint S (t) 6 Smax. Actually, none
of the previously studied results give rise to explicit constraints on the level and dynamics
of S(t).
T h ee q u a t i o ng o v e r n i n gt h ed y n a m i c so ft h es t oc ko fpo l l u t a n t si s
•
S (t)=E (1 − z(t))−
δS (t),w i t h0 <S 0 6 Smax, Ez > 0, Ezz < 0, E (1) = 0 and E (0) = EM > 0. Solving





E(1 − z (τ))e
−δ(t−τ)dτ.( 3 9 )
The ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. is a ﬁnite value that approaches zero as (t − t0) tends
to +∞, and the integral of the second term is a convergent one as long as the function
E(.) g r o w sa tm o s ta tap o s i t i v ee x p o n e n t i a lr a t el o w e rt h a nδ.I nf a c t ,t h ea s s u m e dm o r e
restrictive condition Ezz < 0 suﬃces to guarantee such a convergence of the integral, given
the presence of an exponential discount term. Beyond this, since the model predicts that










E (1 − z)
δ
,( 4 0 )
where lim
t→∞ S (t) ≡ S∞ =
E(1−z)
δ .G i v e nS0 and a constant value for z,t h es t o c ko fp o l l u -
tants always converges monotonically to a constant ﬁnite value, which is determined by
emissions corresponding to such a value of the dirtiness index and the constant rate of
natural regeneration δ. This result, however, does not suﬃces to prevent the environmen-
tal catastrophe. In our model, this situation may arise for a suﬃciently high value of z
given that Ez > 0 and S∞ depends positively on z.
In particular, z could be chosen at a level for which emissions ﬂow is exactly balanced
out by the regeneration corresponding to the natural capacity of the environment to
absorb pollution. In such a case, a steady state
•
S (t)=0arises from the beginning17 and
then ∀t
S (t)= S∞= S0 =
E (1− z)
δ
.( 4 1 )
Therefore, if z< z then S (t) monotonically decreases below S0 converging to a certain
S∞ <S 0, while if z> z then S (t) monotonically increases converging to S∞ >S 0.T h e
no-catastrophe condition requires that S (t) 6 Smax for every t ≥ t0 and, in particular,
that S∗(t) 6 Smax,b e i n gS∗(t) the socially optimal path for the stock of pollutants. This
one emerges from the optimal balanced growth path, and is determined by substituting
the value z∗ into (40). Given monotonicity, the no-catastrophe condition is ensured when
S∗
∞ 6 Smax,w h e r eS∗
∞ =
E(1−z∗)
δ is the limiting value for the stock of pollutants.
Let zmax be the value of z(t) that eventually makes the stock of pollutants to catch
up with the catastrophic level Smax, and which satisﬁes δSmax = E (1 − zmax).T h e n ,
looking for a socially optimal positive balanced growth path that could be compatible
with a non-catastrophic ecological state of the economy, we additionally need to impose
17Sometimes, the condition for stationarity has been taken as a condition for sustainability of the bal-
anced growth path [Chevé (2000)]. This one may be considered as a very strong, near the consevationists,
position where the stock of pollutants and other environmental variables remain constant while the rest
of economic variables are still allowed to grow at a constant positive rate. However, as we will show
immediately, it becomes excessive unless the upper ecological limit had been reached.
24the parameter constraint
AΦ − αρ + αΦn 6 z
max(AΦ − αA + αΦA).( 4 2 )
This condition, which corresponds to z∗ 6 zmax, is necessary and suﬃcient and also
establishes the margins for sustainable optimal growth, given that zmax depends positively
on the ecologically determined parameters Smax and δ. However, z∗ is endogenously
decided and, on the contrary, depends on preference and technological parameters. Thus,
only if parameters determining the values of the variables along the balanced growth path
satisfy condition (42), then the sustained socially optimal growth will be also ecologically
sustainable in the long-run.
6.1 Optimal growth and environmental policy when we reach
the limits of sustainability
Now, to complement the previous study of the sustainability of the long-run balanced
growth path, we will derive the socially optimal behavior of the main variables in the
model once the limits of the ecologically sustainable growth have been reached. Namely,
the behavior of the economy when S (t) catch up with the upper-limit Smax not eventually
in the limit but at a ﬁnite moment in time. This case shows a great parallelism with the
problem concerning the global warming of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere caused by
the anthropogenically enhanced greenhouse eﬀect. It is well-known that the greenhouse
gases accumulated in the atmosphere have reached the critical level which will lead to
a catastrophic climate change. In this context, it is of great interest to know how can
we manage eﬃciently this situation and what must we do, if we can do something, to
guarantee a positive rate of growth in the long-run. The Kioto protocol, by imposing
reductions on polluting emissions, represents a valuable instrument that arises from the
necessary cooperating context and may contribute to resolve the previous problem.
According to this, we will study here the general optimal control solution when the
non-negativity constraint, the control variable constraint and, specially, the state variable
25constraint are explicitly introduced into the dynamic optimization problem. This problem,
which endogenizes both the local and aggregate externalities assuming that the central
planner takes simultaneously into account the total costs and beneﬁts from pollution
abatement and the global negative eﬀect of an ecological catastrophe, is formulated and
solved in the Appendix. Next, we shall interpret the corresponding ﬁrst order conditions.
Consider that S (tc)=Smax for some tc >t 0. This happens when the socially optimal
value of the dirtiness index may be found on the interval zmax 6 z∗ 6 1. According to
what has been previously shown if zmax = z∗ then tc =+ ∞,w h e r e a si fzmax <z ∗ then
tc < +∞. Actually, only the latter becomes economically interesting at this point because
in such a case the ecological limit to growth appears as a binding constraint in ﬁnite time.18
Hence, using the ﬁrst order conditions, we ﬁrst deduce
•
θ (tc) < 0. Then, given that θ is
not allowed to be negative, we conclude that θ(tc) > 0 and E(1 −z)=δS = δSmax.T h e







max,( 4 3 )
irrespective of its previous value. This means that at tc the central planner optimally
decides a discrete and instantaneous change in the value of the dirtiness index from
z∗ >z max to zc = zmax. Moreover, the strict inequality zc < 1, which is required for a
non-zero marginal utility of consumption, also implies η(tc)=0 .
Therefore, the dynamic equation for s becomes
•
s= −ns,f r o mw h i c hw eg e ts =
s(tc)e−n(t−tc) and
•
S=0 , which in turn implies that ∀t>t c S = Smax, θ > 0 and
•
θ< 0.
Thus, the dirtiness index will remain stuck to the value zc < 1,a n dt h e nη =0 ,f o ra l l
t>t c. Moreover, the solution to the dynamic equation
•
µ=( ρ + δ)µ − δθent,s t a r t i n g
from tc,i sµ = µ(tc)e(ρ+δ)(t−tc) −
R t
tc δθ(τ)enτe(ρ+δ)(t−τ)dτ. The dynamics of this shadow
18It is easy to show that










which implies that the span of time elapsed before we reach the ecological limit, T = tc −t0, depends on












26price couples to such of s, which is explained by population growth, and the transversality
condition lim
t→∞ e−(ρ−n)(t−tc)µs =0implies µ(tc)=
R ∞
tc δθ(τ)enτe−(ρ+δ)(τ−tc)dτ,w h e r et h e
integral is bounded because the integrand converges to zero, given that θ is positive but






−(ρ+δ)(τ−t)dτ 6=0 .( 4 4 )
The particular dynamics for q, c and k arise from the solution to the dynamic system
q =( 1− z
c)
α(1−Φ) c







c,( 4 6 )
•
k=( Az
c − n)k − c,( 4 7 )




−Φk =0 .( 4 8 )
This dynamic system is similar in its structure to the standard AK model, but the
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c)exp{−(Az
c − ρ)(t − t
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27These results completely characterize the economic system after period tc, just on the
limits of the ecological catastrophe with an accumulated stock of pollutants equal to Smax
and the dirtiness index ﬁxed at the level zc = zmax, which depends exclusively on the
parameters of the emissions function (the rate of natural regeneration and the previous
maximum stock) according to (43). Moreover, variables k, c and y grow at a common
constant rate, which is positive under the assumption of a constant return to capital
greater than the social discount rate, rc ≡ Azc > ρ . In this case, however, the socially
optimal rate of growth and dirtiness index do not depend on the weight of environmental
care in utility, α, or the population growth rate, n. Finally, according to the parameter
constraint (53), which comes from the transversality condition (48), the ratio consumption
to capital stock is constant and positive. Therefore, the model does not show transitional
dynamics beyond tc and all the endogenous variables conform again a unique socially
optimal balanced growth path.
Along this balanced growth path, the rate of growth γc may be greater, equal or
smaller than γ∗ depending on the sign of the relationship between zc and z∗.T h a t i s
γc T γ∗ if, and only if, zc T z∗. However, given that we have initially considered a high
value of the optimal dirtiness index, suﬃcient enough to lead the economy close to the
limits of the ecological catastrophe in ﬁnite time, and then it was optimally changed to a
lower value zc that ensures a constant aggregate stock of pollutants in the environment,
we conclude that the rate of growth along this new path is smaller than the previous one.
As the previous results show, the emissions control and reduction recommended in the
Kioto protocol seems to be a suitable policy if we want to avoid the ecological catastrophe.
The evidence about the enhanced greenhouse eﬀect and the global warming trend tells us
that the critical level for the accumulated greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has been
reached. Consequently, only coordinated actions involving governmental policies that sta-
bilize and reduce the aggregate stock of such greenhouse eﬀect pollutants may be eﬀective
at this stage. Moreover, the Kioto protocol also includes many other accompanying poli-
cies, which taken together may help to guarantee global eﬃciency and positive long-run
growth. In short, we think that the proposals of this international treaty are essential to
28enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
From the socially optimal solution to the environmental problem compared with the
decentralized one, we identify diﬀerent opportunities for government interventions. First
of all, an institutional one, which involves the government correcting the externalities
associated with the local pollution abatement and the global environmental catastrophe.
This may be done by setting the usual Pigouvian taxes and subsidies on pollution and
abatement that make the competitive economy to work eﬃciently. Alternatively, the gov-
ernment may develop an allocative function, which implies a direct participation by means
of a public abatement provision greater than the one decided in a decentralized economy.
Moreover, if the optimal choice for economic variables lead the stock of pollutants to
catch up with the critical upper-limit, then the government may impose abruptly cleaner
technologies by increasing abatement suddenly, which will reduce pollution standards and
control for the stock of pollutants in a short period of time. This will just make station-
ary or even to decrease the stock of pollutants, which is needed to avoid the ecological
catastrophe. On the other hand, the government may implement indirect environmental
policies such as information or awareness campaigns [Chevé (2000)]. These ones inﬂuence
social preferences for environmental conservation, the environmental willingness to pay
and, hence, the demand for environmental quality. In other words, participation can make
people more environmentally conscious and may prevent that the environment be felt as
an obstacle to growth [Bimonte (2001)]. Finally, the government may put into action
population controls and other development encouraging measures that accelerate the de-
mographic transition. This is important because of the inﬂuence of population growth on
the environmental quality and the long-run rate of growth.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have built a general equilibrium one-sector endogenous growth model in
which pollution is a by-product of economic activity but it may be reduced by spending
a fraction of the aggregate output on abatement. We identify two types of externalities.
29First, a local pollution externality associated with the emissions ﬂow and abatement
activities. Second, an aggregatee x t e r n a l i t yw h i c hc o m e sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tp e o p l et a k e
into account the local negative eﬀect from pollution, but they are not aware of the global
negative eﬀect from the accumulated stock of pollutants. To tackle this problem, which
has a great parallelism with the problem of the global warming of the Earth’s surface and
atmosphere caused by the anthropogenically enhanced greenhouse eﬀect, we introduce an
absolute upper-limit to the accumulated stock of pollutants beyond which we fall in an
ecological catastrophe. First of all, we study the decentralized competitive economy. The
equilibrium path is not Pareto-optimal and sustained growth is not sustainable, leading
the economy to an environmental catastrophe. Consequently, we move to study the
socially optimal equilibrium.
We have proved that the optimal path does exists, it is unique, and does not show
transitional dynamics. We found that the rate of growth depends negatively on the weight
of environmental care in utility and positively on the population growth rate. Moreover,
the latter eﬀect is stronger as higher is the weight of environment in the utility function.
We also found a trade-oﬀ between growth and environmental quality, which results from
agent decisions, because increased abatement eﬀort crowds out resources from capital
accumulation and growth. That is, the higher the rate of growth the higher the dirtiness
index associated with production. However, this is not a problem at least until the stock
of pollutants catch up with the ecological critical level.
We have analyzed the opportunities for an eﬃcient management of the economy with
special attention to the potential risk of environmental collapse. In the context of our
model, the usual eﬃciency condition is not suﬃcient for sustainability but, as we have
shown, Pareto optimality is necessary to produce sustainable outcomes. We have identiﬁed
conditions for sustainability of the optimal balanced growth path. However, if the stock of
pollution corresponding to the optimal path reaches the upper-limit, the central planner
could still change the value of the dirtiness index by increasing drastically abatement
activity in line with the proposals of the Kioto protocol. Obviously, this means that
even in the aftermath sustainability may be guaranteed but at the cost of a lower rate of
30growth.
8 Appendix
Consider the more general optimal control problem involving either non-negativity con-
straints, pure control variable constraints and pure state-space constraints, applied to our
endogenous growth model with environmental concern and awareness. In particular, such
constraints are: (i) z (t) > 0,( i i )1 − z (t) > 0 and (iii) S (t) 6 Smax, which add to the
usual dynamic and boundary constraints for k and S.
The third type of constraint in the above classiﬁcation consists of one constraint in
which no control variables are present. This constraint places a restriction on the state
space, delimitating the permissible area for the accumulated stock of pollutants. Writing
the current stock in per capita terms we get Smax − ents(t) > 0. However, given that
ents(t) is not allowed to exceed Smax, when the constraint is binding, i.e. S (t)=Smax,










where we have made use of the equation representing the motion of the stock of pollutants
in per capita terms
•
s (t)=e(1 − z (t))−(δ + n)s(t). Then, the current value Hamiltonian





c1−Φ (1 − z)
α(1−Φ)
1 − Φ
+ q[Akz − c − nk]+µ[e(1 − z) − (δ + n)s]+
+η[1 − z] − θe
nt [e(1 − z) − δs].
Here, q and µ are the co-states for k and s respectively, and η and θ are Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the control variable constraint and the state variable constraint
respectively. Both η and θ are dynamic multipliers because their corresponding constraints
must be satisﬁed at every period t. Given that the control inequality constraint is linear,
the ﬁrst order necessary conditions arising from Pontryagin’s principle and Kuhn-Tucker
theorem are
31q = c
−Φ (1 − z)
α(1−Φ) ,
qAk + µez − η − θe
ntez −




z > 0, z
h






k= Akz − c − nk,
•
q= ρq − Azq,
•
s= e(1 − z) − (δ + n)s,
•
µ=( ρ + δ)µ − δθe
nt,
1 − z > 0, η > 0, η(1 − z)=0 ,
e(1 − z) − δs 6 0, θ > 0, θ[e(1 − z) − δs]=0 .
To make clear that the three latter rows of ﬁrst order conditions only apply when
ents(t)=Smax, we append the complementary-slackness condition and the restriction on
the way θ changes over time
S 6 Smax, θ[S − Smax]=0 ,
•
θ6 0( = 0 when S<S max).







These necessary conditions are also suﬃcient for a maximum because the Hamiltonian
function satisﬁes the required concavity conditions. It is easy to see that, when the
constraints mentioned at the beginning of this appendix are nonbinding, the previous ﬁrst
order conditions reduce to the ones studied in section 4, giving only interior solutions.
However, if anyone of such constraints changes its status from nonbinding to binding, then
the previous ﬁrst order conditions become fully operative and corner solutions are also
feasible. This is the case analyzed in section 6 with special regard to the pure state-space
constraint.
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